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ARTICLES
A Critical Look at How Top Colleges and
Universities are Adjudicating
Sexual Assault
TAMARA RICE LAVE*
This Article examines the procedural protections afforded by the top American colleges and universities. After
briefly situating these policies historically, it presents original research on the procedural protections provided by the
top twenty universities, top ten liberal arts colleges, and top
five historically black colleges as ranked by U.S. News and
World Reports. In 2015, university administrators were contacted and asked a series of questions about the rights afforded to students, including the standard of proof, right to
an adjudicatory hearing, right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, right to counsel, right to silence, and right to
appeal. This Article describes the study’s findings and then
compares them with prior studies. It then considers whether
the disciplinary proceedings constitute state action, thus
making them subject to constitutional scrutiny should they
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be challenged in court. This Article concludes by briefly considering whether a student could successfully challenge
these proceedings under contract law or Title IX.
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INTRODUCTION
People across the country are outraged by the way universities
handle sexual assault.1 They argue that rape has become a pervasive
problem on college campuses, and schools aren’t doing enough
1

See Kristen Lombardi, A Lack of Consequences for Sexual Assault, CTR.
24, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/
2010/02/24/4360/lack-consequences-sexual-assault; Kayla Webley, Big Shame
on Campus, MARIE CLAIRE (Oct. 16, 2013), http://www.marieclaire.com/politics/
news/a8217/big-shame-on-campus/; Vanessa Grigoriadis, Meet the College
Women Who Are Starting a Revolution Against Campus Sexual Assault, N.Y.
MAG.: THE CUT (Sept. 21, 2014), http://nymag.com/thecut/2014/09/emma-sulko
wicz-campus-sexual-assault-activism.html.
FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Feb.
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to stop it.2 They rightfully point to cases like Sam Ukawuachu at
Baylor University3 and Jameis Winston at Florida State University4
as examples of universities prioritizing football over victim safety
and offender accountability. They contend that the problem
stretches beyond sports teams, with victims not being taken seriously and even being dissuaded from pursuing charges in some
cases.5 They argue that in the rare case a student is found responsible, he is not adequately punished.6
President Obama listened to these concerns and made addressing campus sexual assault a priority of his presidency.7 In 2011, the
Department of Education Office for Civil Rights (OCR) issued its
Dear Colleague Letter (DCL), in which it called the statistics on sexual violence “deeply troubling and a call to action for the nation.”8
After reminding universities that sexual violence constitutes a form
of discrimination under Title IX,9 OCR told universities that in order
to be in compliance with Title IX, they had to change disciplinary
proceedings to more effectively hold rapists accountable.10 In no uncertain terms, it told universities that they had to reduce the standard
of proof in disciplinary proceedings to a preponderance of the evidence, and it strongly discouraged universities from allowing the

2

Webley, supra note 1.
Jessica Luther, Silence at Baylor, TEXAS MONTHLY (Aug. 20, 2015), http://
www.texasmonthly.com/article/silence-at- baylor/.
4
Walt Bogdanich, A Star Player Accused, and a Flawed Rape Investigation,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/04/16/
sports/errors-in-inquiry-on-rape-allegations-against-fsu-jameis-winston.html.
5
See id.
6
Lombardi, supra note 1.
7
Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Memorandum Establishing a White House Task Force to Protect Students from Sexual Assault
(Jan. 22, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/22/memorandum-establishing-white-house-task-force-protect-students-sexual-a.
8
Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of
Educ., Office for Civil Rights, to Colleague 2 (Apr. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Dear
Colleague Letter], http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-20
1104.pdf.
9
Id. at 1.
10
Id. at 1–3, 7–14.
3
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parties to directly question one another.11 OCR threatened to withhold federal funding to universities that did not adequately comply12
and it published a list of schools under investigation that continues
to grow.13 OCR has found a number of schools to be in violation of
Title IX, including Princeton University14 and Harvard Law
School.15 These schools have since reached settlements with OCR,
in which they agreed to change the way they handle sexual assault
so as to meet the protocol set forth in the DCL.16
Some applaud OCR’s efforts,17 including at least ninety professors who signed a White Paper in support of the DCL,18 but others
contend that universities have gone too far in sacrificing the rights
of the accused.19 Members of the law faculty at both Harvard and
11

Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 16.
13
See infra notes 86–109 and accompanying text. See also Press Office, U.S.
Department of Education Releases List of Higher Education Institutions with
Open Title IX Sexual Violence Investigations, DEP’T OF EDUC. (May 1, 2014),
http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-releases-listhigher-education-institutions-open-title-I [hereinafter DOE List].
14
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Princeton University Found in Violation of Title IX, Reaches Agreement with U.S. Education Department to Address,
Prevent Sexual Assault and Harassment of Students (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.
ed.gov/news/press-releases/princeton-university-found-violation-title-ix-reaches
-agreement-us-education-department-address-prevent-sexual-assault-and-harassment-students [hereinafter Princeton Violation].
15
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Harvard Law School Found in Violation of Title IX, Agrees to Remedy Sexual Harassment, including Sexual Assault
of Students (Dec. 30, 2014), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/harvard-lawschool-found-violation-title-ix-agrees- remedy-sexual-harassment-including-sexual-assault-students [hereinafter Harvard Violation].
16
See Princeton Violation, supra note 14; see also Harvard Violation, supra
note 15.
17
See Lavinia M. Weizel, Note, The Process That is Due: Preponderance of
the Evidence as the Standard of Proof for University Adjudications of Student-onStudent Sexual Assault Complaints, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1642–55 (2012); Amy
Chmielewski, Note, Defending the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard in
College Adjudications of Sexual Assault, BYU EDUC. & L.J. 143, 149–56 (2013).
18
Katherine K. Baker, Deborah L. Blake & Nancy Chi Cantalupo, et al., Title
IX and the Preponderance of the Evidence: A White Paper, FEMINIST LAW
PROFESSORS (Aug. 4, 2016), http://www.feministlawprofessors.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Title-IX-Preponderance-White-Paper-signed-10.3.16.pdf.
19
See William A. Jacobson, Accused on Campus: Charges Dropped, But the
Infamy Remains, LEGAL INSURRECTION (May 16, 2015, 8:30 PM), http://legal
12
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the University of Pennsylvania have publicly called for greater procedural rights.20 The popular press has also started to draw attention
to the experiences of men who say their universities never gave them
a meaningful chance to defend themselves before finding them responsible for sexual assault and expelling them.21
Congress has also begun to take notice of the impact the DCL
has had on college campuses.22 On January 7, 2016, Senator James
Lankford, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs and
Federal Management, U.S. Senate Committee on Government Affairs and Homeland Security, wrote a letter to the Acting Secretary
for the Department of Education (DOE) demanding that the DOE
insurrection.com/2015/05/accused-on-campus-charges-dropped-but-the-infamyremains/; see also Naomi R. Shatz, Feminists, We Are Not Winning the War on
Campus Sexual Assault, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 29, 2014, 6:44 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/naomi-shatz/feminists-we-are-not-winn_b_6071500.h
tml. See generally Stephen Henrick, A Hostile Environment for Student Defendants: Title IX and Sexual Assault on College Campuses, 40 N. KY. L. REV. 49
(2013); Barclay Sutton Hendrix, Note, A Feather on One Side, A Brick on the
Other: Tilting the Scale Against Males Accused of Sexual Assault in Campus Disciplinary Proceedings, 47 GA. L. REV. 591, 594 (2013); Ryan D. Ellis, Mandating
Injustice: The Preponderance of the Evidence Mandate Creates a New Threat to
Due Process on Campus, 32 REV. LITIG. 65, 80–81 (2013).
20
See Elizabeth Bartholet et al., Rethink Harvard’s Sexual Harassment Policy, BOSTON GLOBE (Oct. 15, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014
/10/14/rethink-harvard-sexual-harassment-policy/HFDDiZN7nU2UwuUuWMn
qbM/story.html; David Rudovsky et al., Open Letter from Members of the Penn
Law School Faculty, Sexual Assault Complaints: Protecting Complainants and
the Accused Students at Universities, PHILLY.COM (Feb. 18, 2015), http://media.
philly.com/documents/OpenLetter.pdf.
21
See Tovia Smith, Some Accused of Sexual Assault on Campus Say System
Works Against Them, NPR (Sept. 3, 2014, 3:31 AM), http://www.npr.org
/2014/09/03/345312997/some-accused-of-campus-assault-say-the-system-works
-against-them; see also Emily Yoffe, The College Rape Overcorrection, SLATE
(Dec. 7, 2014, 11:53 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2014
/12/college_rape_campus_sexual_assault_is_a_serious_problem_but_the_efforts.html; Teresa Watanabe, More College Men Are Fighting Back Against Sexual Misconduct Cases, L.A. TIMES (June 7, 2014, 6:15 PM), http://www.latimes.
com/local/la-me-sexual-assault-legal-20140608-story.html.
22
See generally Letter from Senator James Lankford, Chairman, Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs and Fed. Mgmt., U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Gov’t Affairs, to The Hon. John B. King, Jr., Acting Sec’y, U.S.
Dep’t of Educ. (Jan. 7, 2016), http://www.lankford.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Sen.%20Lankford%20letter%20to%20Dept.%20of%20Education%201.7.16.
pdf.
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provide statutory authority for the DCL.23 Although Catherine
Lhamon, the Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, provided a response,24 Lankford declared it inadequate.25
In addition, several courts across the country have found that
current protections violate procedural due process.26 For example,
in July 2015, a judge ordered the University of California, San Diego to reverse the suspension of a male student because the disciplinary proceedings violated his due process rights,27 and nine months
later, a different judge overturned the suspension of a University of
Southern California student on the grounds that he was denied a fair
hearing and the substantive evidence did not support the Appeal
Panel’s findings.28 On March 31, 2016, the Massachusetts District
Court ruled in favor of a Brandeis University student who had been
found responsible for “serious sexual transgressions.”29 The court
wrote, “Brandeis appears to have substantially impaired, if not eliminated, an accused student’s right to a fair and impartial process.”30
The court was particularly troubled by the deprivation of the right to

23

Id.
Susan Kruth, OCR Response to Senator’s Inquiry Not All That Responsive,
FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN EDUC. (Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.thefire.
org/ocr-response-to-senators-inquiry-not-all-that-responsive/.
25
Letter from Senator James Lankford, Chairman, Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs and Fed. Mgmt., U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Gov’t Affairs, to The Hon. John B. King, Jr., Acting Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Educ.
(Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.lankford.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/3.4.16%20Lankford%20letter%20to%20Dept.%20of%20Education.pdf.
26
See Jake New, Court Wins for Accused, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 5,
2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/11/05/more-students-punish
ed-over-sexual-assault-are-winning-lawsuits-against-colleges.
27
Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. San Diego, No. 37-2015-00010549CU-WM-CTL, 2015 WL 4394597, at *1, 5 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2015).
28
Doe v. Univ. of S. Cal., 200 Cal. Rptr. 3d 851, 855 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).
29
Doe v. Brandeis Univ., No. 15-11557-FDS, 2016 WL 1274533, at *4 (D.
Mass. Mar. 31, 2016).
30
Id. at *6.
24
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cross-examine31 as well as the lack of notice about the underlying
allegations.32
There is significant interest in campus sexual assault as evidenced by a recent Google search yielding over 18.3 million results.33 However, inadequate attention has been paid to the rights
actually being afforded to students. A 1999 study by Berger and
Berger looked at procedural protections in state and private universities, but it focused on cases of academic misconduct.34 In 2002,
Karjane, Fisher, and Cullen conducted a study, funded by the Department of Justice, into how institutions of higher education (IHEs)
respond to sexual assault.35 Their study was extensive, and it included a content analysis of published sexual assault policy materials from a nationally representative sample.36 Although the scope of
this work is extraordinary, it took place before the 2011 DCL and
may not reflect current practices.
This leaves a major gap in the literature, which this Article and
a recently published companion article37 attempt to fill. Both provide a systematic description, based on original research, of the pro-

31
Id. at *33–35 (“While protection of victims of sexual assault from unnecessary harassment is a laudable goal, the elimination of such a basic protection for
the rights of the accused raises profound concerns. . . . Here, there were essentially
no third-party witnesses to any of the events in question, and there does not appear
to have been any contemporary corroborating evidence. The entire investigation
thus turned on the credibility of the accuser and the accused. Under the circumstances, the lack of an opportunity for cross-examination may have had a very
substantial effect on the fairness of the proceeding.”).
32
Id. at *33–34.
33
A Google search conducted on February 24, 2017 yielded 18,300,000 results.
34
Curtis J. Berger & Vivian Berger, Academic Discipline: A Guide to Fair
Process for the University Student, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 289, 290–94 (1999).
35
HEATHER M. KARJANE, ET AL., Campus Sexual Assault: How America’s
Institutions of Higher Education Respond vii (Oct. 2002), https://www.ncjrs.gov
/pdffiles1/nij/grants/196676.pdf.
36
Id. at vi.
37
Tamara Rice Lave, Ready, Fire, Aim: How Universities Are Failing the
Constitution in Sexual Assault Cases, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 637 (2016).
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cedural protections IHEs provide when a student is accused of sexual assault.38 This Article focuses on the highest-ranked twenty universities, ten liberal arts colleges, and five historically black colleges
as determined by U.S. News and World Reports.
This Article begins by situating university disciplinary proceedings legally and historically. It then moves to the central contribution—the study of procedural protections afforded at the top American colleges and universities. After describing research methods,
this Article presents findings and compares them with prior studies.
Next, it discusses whether these proceedings should be subject to
constitutional scrutiny due to the coercive actions of the Department
of Education. Finally, this Article considers whether students might
be able to prevail on other grounds should courts determine that no
state action exists.
I. LEGAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
On July 2, 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the 1964
Civil Rights Act into law.39 Although much of the Act was aimed at
preventing discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin,40 Title VII—which banned workplace discrimination—specifically included sex as a protected class.41 Congress later
extended the protection against sex discrimination to the classroom
with Title IX.42 Enacted as part of the Educational Amendments of
1972, Title IX barred sex discrimination in any education program
or activity receiving federal financial assistance.43 Although there
were exceptions, such as for fraternities, any institution that violated
Title IX could lose federal funding.44

38

See id.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 21 (2012)).
40
Id. (Title II (Injunctive Relief Against Discrimination in Places of Public
Accommodation); Title III (Desegregation of Public Facilities); Title IV (Desegregation of Public Education); Title VI (Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted
Programs)).
41
Id. § 703(a)(1) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012)).
42
Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, §§ 901–03, 86 Stat.
235, 373–75 (1972) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012)).
43
Id.
44
Id.
39
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At first, the Supreme Court interpreted Title IX narrowly, holding that it did not apply to an entire institution, but solely to the particular program receiving federal assistance.45 Congress responded
by enacting the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 to clarify the
“broad application of title IX.”46 It explicitly extended Title IX to
“all of the operations of . . . a college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public system of higher education . . . any
part of which is extended Federal financial assistance[.]”47
In 1999, the Supreme Court held that Title IX extended to “student-on-student sexual harassment, if sufficiently severe.”48 It then
determined that a school could be held liable for monetary damages
in a private lawsuit if one student sexually harasses another in the
school’s program,49 but it repudiated the standard of liability set
forth in OCR’s 1997 Guidance Document as insufficiently demanding.50 Instead, the Supreme Court held that to prevail, the complainant had to meet the conditions of notice and deliberate indifference
set forth in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District.51

45

See Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 573–74 (1984). See also Trudy
Saunders Bredthauer, Twenty-Five Years Under Title IX: Have We Made Progress?, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1107, 1108–09 (1998); Jollee Faber, Expanding
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 to Prohibit Student to Student Sexual Harassment, 2 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 85, 113 n.119 (1992).
46
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100–259, §187, §2(1),
102 Stat. 28 (1988).
47
Id. § 908(2)(A). Note that the law actually reached more broadly, to extend,
for instance, to “a department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or of a local government.” Id. § 908(1)(A).
48
Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650 (1999).
49
Id. at 650–52. The Court had previously held in Franklin v. Gwinnet
County Public Schools, that students had a private right to damages when their
Title IX rights were violated. 503 U.S. 60, 65 (1992).
50
Davis, 526 U.S. at 651; Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12034
(Mar. 13, 1997) [hereinafter 1997 Guidance] (setting the standard of liability at
“knows or should have known”).
51
Davis, 526 U.S. at 647–48, 641–42; see also Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep.
Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998) (holding that to recover damages the plaintiff
must prove “an official who at a minimum has authority to address the alleged
discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the recipient’s behalf has
actual knowledge of discrimination in the recipient’s programs” and “refuses to
take action to bring the recipient into compliance.”).
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These rulings extended the federal government’s power to police
colleges and universities.52 As long as a school receives federal
funding, the institution is required to comply with Title IX.53 Federal student loans count, which effectively makes every college and
university subject to Title IX.54 And since institutions are now liable
for the harassment of one student against another, they can at least
theoretically no longer afford to ignore what happens in dorm rooms
and fraternities.55 At the same time, however, the Court showed in
Gebser that it would not hesitate to reign in the Department of Education if the justices found its interpretation of Title IX deficient.56
Despite the high standard of proof for liability, universities face
significant lawsuits.57 United Educators (UE), which provides insurance to 1,200-member universities, recently began offering insurance to cover sexual assault payouts.58 Between 2006 and 2010, UE
paid out $36 million; 72% of the settlements were provided to parties suing the schools for incidents of sexual assault.59 In 2014, the
University of Connecticut paid $1.28 million to settle a suit, and the
University of Colorado at Boulder settled a suit for $825,000.60
A. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights
Congress explicitly left enforcement of Title IX in the hands of
the departments and agencies that allocate federal funds to education
programs and/or activities.61 These agencies were “authorized and
directed” to effectuate the prohibition against sexual discrimination.62 They were supposed to do so “by issuing rules, regulations,
52

See generally Gebser, 524 U.S. at 274; Davis, 526 U.S. at 629.
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 § 908(1)(A).
54
See Title IX Legal Manual, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.
gov/crt/title-ix#A.%C2%A0%20Federal%20Financial%20Assistance (last updated Aug. 6, 2015).
55
See, e.g., Davis, 526 U.S. at 650.
56
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 280, 290–292.
57
Gayle Nelson, The High Cost of Sexual Assaults on College Campuses,
NONPROFIT Q. (June 23, 2015) https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2015/06/23/the-high
-cost-of-sexual-assaults-on-college-campuses/.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Large Loss Report 2015, UNITED EDUCATORS (2015), https://www.ue.org
/uploadedFiles/Large_loss_2015_Final.pdf.
61
20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2012).
62
Id.
53
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or orders of general applicability[.]”63 Compliance with these rules
could be achieved “(1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to
continue assistance under such program or activity . . . or (2) by any
other means authorized by law[.]”64 OCR has published three guides
on how schools should adjudicate sexual cases.65
1. THE 1997 OCR GUIDE
In 1997, OCR published its first official guidance in the Federal
Register on how schools should investigate and resolve allegations
of sexual harassment.66 Before drafting the document, OCR met
with representatives from interested parties, including students,
teachers, school administrators, and researchers.67 It also twice publicly requested comments.68
In the 1997 guide, OCR enumerated certain factors that grievance procedures should contain in order to be in compliance with
Title IX.69 They included provisions providing for notice to students
and other interested parties, such as “[a]dequate, reliable, and impartial investigation of complaints, including the opportunity to present witnesses and other evidence”; “[d]esignated and reasonably
prompt timeframes for the major stages of the complaint process”;
notice of the outcome to the parties; and “[a]n assurance that the
school will take steps to prevent reoccurrence of any harassment and
to correct its discriminatory effects on the complainant and others,
if appropriate.”70 OCR explicitly permitted schools to use a general
student disciplinary procedure in responding to sexual harassment.71

63

Id.
Id.
65
See generally 1997 Guidance, supra note 50; U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF
STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES 3 (Jan.
2001), https://www2.ed.gov/offices/OCR/archives/pdf/shguide.pdf [hereinafter
2001 GUIDANCE]; Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 8.
66
1997 Guidance, supra note 50.
67
Id. at 12035.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 12044.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 12045.
64
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The 1997 Guide also discussed the due process rights of the accused.72 OCR wrote: “The rights established under Title IX must be
interpreted consistently with any federally guaranteed rights involved in a complaint proceeding.”73 In addition to constitutional
rights, OCR recognized that there could be additional rights created
by state law, institutional regulations and policies, and collective
bargaining.74 OCR emphasized that respecting the procedural rights
of both parties was an important part of a just outcome:
Indeed, procedures that ensure the Title IX rights of
the complainant while at the same time according
due process to both parties involved will lead to
sound and supportable decisions. Schools should ensure that steps to accord due process rights do not restrict or unnecessarily delay the protections provided
by Title IX to the complainant.75
2. THE 2001 OCR GUIDE
In 2001, OCR published a revised guide to sexual harassment
under Title IX in the Federal Register principally in response to the
Supreme Court’s rulings in Gebser and Davis.76 Just like the 1997
Guide, the 2001 Guide went through notice and comment.77 Although the Supreme Court had rejected the standard of liability advocated by OCR for liability in a private lawsuit, OCR emphasized
that it still had the power to “‘promulgate and enforce requirements
that effectuate [Title IX’s] nondiscrimination mandate,’ even in circumstances that would not give rise to a claim for money damages.”78
The most important change to the section on adjudication of sexual harassment complaints was an increased emphasis on the rights
72

Id.
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
2001 GUIDANCE, supra note 65, at ii. In the 1997 Guide, OCR said that the
standard of liability for monetary damages should be “knows or should have
known[,]” a standard that was clearly rejected in Gebser. See 1997 Guidance, supra note 50, at 12039.
77
2001 GUIDANCE, supra note 65, at ii.
78
Id.
73
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of the accused.79 The 2001 Guide now had a section entitled, “Due
Process Rights of the Accused.”80 In addition to being slightly reorganized, this newly appointed section told schools that “the Family
Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) does not override federally protected due process rights of persons accused of sexual harassment.”81 It concluded by saying: “Schools should be aware of these
rights and their legal responsibilities to individuals accused of harassment.”82
3. THE 2011 DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER
In 2011, OCR issued what has come to be known as the Dear
Colleague Letter, which OCR deemed to be a “significant guidance
document.”83 OCR contended that the DCL “does not add requirements to applicable law, but provides information and examples to
inform recipients about how OCR evaluates whether covered entities are complying with their legal obligations.”84
Unlike the 1997 and 2001 Guide, OCR did not post a formal
notice requesting feedback on the proposed changes.85 Yet it still
laid out several recommendations and requirements in the DCL,86
and two are of particular note. First, OCR strongly discouraged
schools from allowing the parties to directly question one another.87
Second, OCR told schools that they “must use a preponderance of
the evidence,”88 and it advised that the clear and convincing standard used by some schools violated Title IX.89

79
80
81
82
83
84
85

Id. at 22; see 1997 Guidance, supra note 50, at 12045.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id.
Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 8, at 1 n.1.
Id.
Id. See also 1997 Guidance, supra note 50; 2001 GUIDANCE, supra note

65.
86

See generally id. For a detailed discussion of all the changes, see generally
Tamara Rice Lave, Campus Sexual Assault Adjudication: Why Universities
Should Reject the Dear Colleague Letter, 64 KAN. L. REV. 915 (2016) [hereinafter
Reject the Dear Colleague Letter].
87
Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 8, at 12.
88
Id. at 11.
89
Id.

390

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:377

OCR justified reducing the standard of proof to preponderance
on the ground that it was the standard used in Title VII hearings.90
The difficulty with this justification, however, was that OCR did not
also adopt Title VII protections that would have benefited the accused.91 For instance, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 gives both parties
in a Title VII case the right to a jury trial if one party requests compensatory or punitive damages.92 The right to trial means that both
parties enjoy a panoply of other protections such as the right to counsel and the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. Not only
did OCR not mandate that these Title VII rights be provided, but it
also affirmatively recommended against some of them.93 For instance, OCR strongly discouraged schools from allowing the parties
to directly question one another, and it did not suggest any alternative.94
B. Enforcement
Although a university has never lost federal funding for violating Title IX,95 DOE has been taking a more aggressive stance.96 As
mentioned above, OCR has found a number of schools to be in violation of Title IX, including Princeton97 and Harvard Law School.98
These schools have since reached settlements with OCR in which
they agreed to change the way they handle sexual assault so as to
meet the protocol set forth in the DCL.99
On May 1, 2014, DOE released a list of fifty-four colleges and
universities under investigation,100 and that number has grown—
90

Id.
Id. at 10, 12.
92
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–166, 105 Stat. 1071–1100, 1073.
93
Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 8, at 12.
94
Id.
95
As of May 1, 2014, no university had ever lost funding for violating Title
IX. See Tyler Kingkade, 55 Colleges Face Sexual Assault Investigations,
HUFFINGTON POST (last updated July 1, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2014/05/01/college-sexual-assault_n_5247267.html.
96
See, e.g., Princeton Violation, supra note 14; Harvard Violation, supra note
15.
97
Princeton Violation, supra note 14.
98
Harvard Violation, supra note 15.
99
See Princeton Violation, supra note 14; Harvard Violation, supra note 15.
100
DOE List, supra note 13.
91
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there are currently 310 open cases, with multiple schools facing
more than one investigation.101 There is no finding of fact required
to be placed on this list; it simply requires a complaint by one person.102 Importantly, this release conflicts with the policies applicable to other federal agencies. For example, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is statutorily barred from releasing the names of those under investigation in Title VII cases,103 and
“[a]ny person who makes public information in violation of this subsection shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not
more than one year, or both.”104 Similarly, the Department of Justice
has an explicit policy against releasing information on current investigations except in unusual circumstances.105
Even if universities don’t take the threat of losing federal funding seriously, such public shaming is almost certainly having an effect.106 Two recent articles have discussed how universities under
suspicion for violating Title IX are receiving fewer applications
from prospective students and fewer donations from alumni.107
II. SURVEY RESEARCH
In June 2015, the highest-ranked twenty universities, the top ten
liberal arts colleges, and the top five historically black colleges, as
determined by the 2014 U.S. News and World Reports higher education rankings,108 were contacted by email and asked a series of

101

See Title IX: Tracking Sexual Assault Investigations, THE CHRON. OF
HIGHER EDUC., http://projects.chronicle.com/titleix/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2017).
102
DOE List, supra note 13.
103
42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(b) (2012).
104
Id.
105
Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/usao-ri/frequently-asked-questions-0 (last updated June 23, 2015) (“Justice Department guidelines, rules of professional conduct, and rules of court, as
well as considerations of fairness to defendants, require that we not make comments that could prejudice a defendant’s right to a fair trial.”).
106
See, e.g., Nelson supra note 57; Tyler Kingkade, Alumni Are Creating a
Network to Put Pressure on Universities over Sexual Assault, HUFFINGTON POST
(May 29, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/28/alumni-network-sex
ual-assault-college_n_5401194.html.
107
Nelson, supra note 57; Kingkade, supra note 106.
108
The author referred to the list compiled by the 2014 U.S. News and World
Reports. National University Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., (Sept. 10,
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questions about the procedural protections afforded to students alleged to have committed sexual assault. All were asked about protections considered fundamental to those accused of a crime by the
state: the standard of proof, the right to an adjudicatory hearing, the
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, the right to counsel,
the right to silence, and the right to appeal. Other than the right to
appeal, all are part of the Bill of Rights, which through the incorporation clause of the Fourteenth Amendment have been deemed to
apply to the states.109
Although a few schools responded to the initial inquiry, many
did so only after further additional emails and phone calls. Some
administrators were extremely reluctant to share information.
Online policies were used to fill in the gaps as much as possible, and
follow-up email and/or phone calls were attempted to confirm results. During the course of writing this Article, this Author became
aware that one university had changed from the traditional adjudicatory method to the investigatory model. The results were changed
accordingly, but the reader should be aware that other schools may
have also changed their method of adjudication since the gathering
of data for this Article.

2013) http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-colleges/rankings/national-universities/spp+25 [https://web.archive.org/web/20140707054623/http://
colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-colleges/rankings/national-universities/spp+25]; National Liberal Arts College Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., (Sept. 10, 2013) http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-colleges/rankings/national-liberal-arts-colleges/spp+25 [https://web.archive.org/we
b/20140401054309/http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-college
s/rankings/national-liberal-arts-colleges/spp+25]; Historically Black College and
Universities Ranking, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., (Sept. 10, 2013) http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-colleges/rankings/hbcu [https://web.
archive.org/web/20140401084614/http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.co
m/best-colleges/rankings/hbcu].
109
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. (The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution prohibits states from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”). In determining what that means, the Supreme
Court turned to the first eight Amendments of the Constitution, otherwise known
as the Bill of Rights. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X. Over time, in piecemeal fashion,
the Court held that almost all of these rights were protected against state action
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See generally
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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A. Findings
The tables below show the findings of this investigation.
Table 1: Standard of Proof
Standard of proof

Different standard
for non-sex
offenses?

94%
3% Beyond
3%
Preponderance Reasonable Unknown
of the evidence
Doubt
(1)
(34)
(1)
22%
Yes
(8)

64%
No
(23)

14%
Unknown
(5)

As Table 1 shows, thirty-four of the institutions of higher education (94%) set the standard of proof at preponderance of the evidence, one used beyond a reasonable doubt, and one was unknown.
Eight IHEs (22%) set a different standard of proof for non-sex allegations; all but one made that standard more onerous. Twenty-three
IHEs (64%) used the same standard, and five (14%) were unknown.
Table 2: Right to an Adjudicatory Hearing
56%
Adjudicatory
Adjudicatory
or
(20)
Investigatory

44%
Investigatory
(16)

0%
Unknown

All schools used either an adjudicatory or an investigatory
model for determining whether a violation occurred. The twenty
schools (56%) that used the adjudicatory model conducted an initial
investigation, but the determination of whether a violation occurred
could only be made at an adjudicatory hearing. An adjudicatory
hearing is similar to a trial in the sense that evidence is presented in
one hearing in front of a fact finder with the accused present. Witnesses testify at the hearing, although schools usually allow hearsay
evidence, which means that the fact finder may consider a witness
interview conducted by the Title IX investigator.
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Sixteen schools (44%) used an investigatory model. The investigatory model is one in which a single investigator (or sometimes
two) prepares a report after having met with the parties and any witnesses. The accused student does not have the right to be present for
these interviews. Sometimes that same investigator determines
whether a violation occurred, and sometimes the report is turned
over to a third party (or parties) who determine(s) whether a violation occurred based on the contents of the investigation report. That
person may request additional information, but there will never be a
live hearing in which all of the evidence is presented in one place,
with the accused present.
Table 3: Schools that Provide Right to Adjudicatory
Hearing
Adjudicatory Model Detail (% of 20 schools)
70% - Yes (14)
Right to an 25% - Yes, Limited:
Adjudicatory school decides (5)
Hearing
5% - Yes, Limited: evidence (1)

Panel
Composition

Right to
Challenge
Panelist
Panel vote

0%
Unknown
(0)

10% - 1 staff / faculty / admin /
outsider (2)
20%
40% - 3 or more faculty / staff / Unknown
(4)
admin (8)
25% - 3 or more faculty / staff /
student (5)
5% - 3 or more unspecified (1)
60% - Yes (12)
60% - majority (12)
10% - 1 decider (2)
15% - 3 or more
deciders unanimous (3)

0% - No

40%
Unknown
(8)
15%
Unknown
(3)
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For the twenty schools that used the adjudicatory model, fourteen (70%) gave the accused the absolute right to an adjudicatory
hearing. That meant that if he requested a hearing to resolve guilt,
he would get one. Five schools (25%) allowed for an adjudicatory
hearing, but only if the school decided it was the appropriate way to
determine guilt. For instance, at one school, the investigator prepared a report, to which the parties had a chance to review and respond. A separate panel then reviewed the report and made a determination of responsibility. If that panel unanimously agreed that a
hearing was not necessary, then it would make its decision based
only on the investigation report. If it decided a hearing was necessary, then there would be a closed hearing where both parties and
witnesses were allowed to testify. One school (5%) allowed for an
adjudicatory hearing but significantly limited the evidence that
could be admitted. For instance, it might allow the parties to testify
but prohibit any witness testimony, even if it was relevant to the
determination of responsibility. Instead, the fact finder would rely
on the witness statements included in the investigation report.
For those schools that used an adjudicatory model, two (10%)
allowed a single person to determine responsibility. Eight schools
(40%) had a panel of three or more faculty, staff, or administrators.
Five (25%) had a panel of three or more, but it included students.
One (5%) had a panel of three or more to determine responsibility,
but the composition of that panel was unspecified. The composition
of the panel for four schools (20%) was unknown.
Twelve schools (60%) used a majority vote to determine guilt.
The minimum size of the adjudicatory hearing using a majority vote
was three. Two schools (10%) had one person make the decision,
and three schools (15%) required that the decision be unanimous.
For three schools (15%), the results were unknown.
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Table 4: Schools that Use Investigatory Model110
Investigatory Model Detail (% of 16 schools)
38% - Single Model: Investigator
& Decision-Maker are the Same (6)
Who
6%
Decides
13% - Split Model: Investigator
Unknown
Responsibility Reports & Separate Single
(1)
Individual Decides (2)
44% - Split Model: Investigator
Reports & 2 or More
Individuals Decide (7)
All of the schools that used the investigatory model had an investigator prepare a report as to what occurred, but they differed in
who determined responsibility. Six schools (38%) used the single
investigator model. That meant that the person who investigated the
case was also responsible for determining whether a violation had
occurred. Two schools (12.5=13%) used a split model in which one
person investigated and a separate person determined whether a violation had occurred. Seven schools (43.75=44%) had two or more
people (all separate from the investigator) determine whether a violation had occurred.
Table 5: Right to Confront and Cross Examine111

Right to
Confront

Yes - 6% (2)
Limited through investigator - 8% (3)
Limited through panel - 50% (18)
No - 30.6=31% (11)
Unknown - 6% (2)

Only two of the schools (6%) provided the right to directly question the accuser. Three (8%) allowed the accused to submit questions to the investigator who would decide whether or not to ask
those questions. Of course, the accused would not be present to hear
the questions or the responses, and so this approach denies the
110
111

The numbers are rounded so they do not add up to 100%.
The numbers are rounded so they do not add up to 100%.
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accused the right to confront and cross-examine. Eighteen schools
(50%) allowed the student to submit questions to the hearing panel,
which would determine whether to ask them. Eleven schools
(30.6%=31%) did not allow the accused to ask questions of his
accuser in any capacity. For two schools (6%), the results were unknown.
Table 6: Additional Procedural Rights112
Procedural
Right
Right
to Counsel

Right to
Remain
Silent
Right to
Appeal

Yes
Yes,
robust
3% (1)

Yes, no
adverse
inference
56% (20)

Yes, as
advisor
but silent
in
hearing
85% (31)

Yes,
but
limited
role
3% (1)

Yes, but adverse
inference may be
drawn
0% (0)
Yes
100% (36)

No

Unknown

6%
(2)

3%
(1)

3%
(1)

42%
(15)

0%
(0)

0%
(0)

As Table 6 shows, the vast majority of universities (91%) gave
accused students the right to counsel, but it was almost always an
abridged right. In thirty-one schools (85%), attorneys could be present, but only in the capacity of an advisor. They were not allowed
to address the investigator or the panel in any way. One school (3%)
allowed attorneys to participate, but in a limited fashion. Two
schools (6%) did not allow for any right to counsel. Only one school
(3%) gave students a more robust right to counsel. That meant the
attorney would be allowed to participate fully in the hearing by questioning witnesses and addressing the panel directly. For one school
(3%), the results were unknown.
112

The numbers are rounded so they do not add up to 100%.
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All but one of the known universities (55.6%=56%) gave the respondent the right to remain silent. One school (3%) did not give
students the right to remain silent, and for fifteen schools (42%) the
results were unknown.
Finally, all schools promised the right to appeal. Most schools
limited the appeal to procedural grounds, and this Author is aware
of only one school that allowed an appeal of the factual findings.
B. Comparison with Other Studies
University protections for students charged with misconduct
have received surprisingly little attention with only two empirical
studies over the past thirty years. In 1999, Carl and Vivian Berger
studied the protections that state and private universities provided to
students charged with academic misconduct.113 They sent letters to
222 public and private universities selected at random and received
responses from 159.114 Berger and Berger found that 90% provided
for a hearing before an impartial body (as compared with twenty, or
56% here); 90% allowed the accused to remain silent without an adverse finding of guilt (as compared with twenty, or 56% here); and
over 90% gave students the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (as compared with two, or 6% that gave the right,
and twenty-one, or 58% that gave a limited right here).115 One area
in which IHEs have improved is the right to counsel. Berger and
Berger found that only 58% of the state schools surveyed allowed
the advisor to be an attorney (as compared with 91% that allowed
lawyers in at least some situations).116 As with present procedures,
those schools that did provide the right to counsel often prohibited
direct participation.117
In 2002, Heather M. Karjane, Bonnie S. Fisher, and Francis T.
Cullen studied how IHEs adjudicate sexual assault.118 They used a
multi-faceted approach including a content analysis of published

113
114
115
116
117
118

See generally Berger & Berger, supra note 34.
Id. at 296.
Id. at 297–98.
Id. at 298.
Id.
See generally KARJANE, ET AL., supra note 35.
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sexual assault policy materials, email surveys of campus administrators, and field research at eight colleges and universities.119 Their
sample was comprised of 2,438 schools, and they received an overall response rate of 41%.120
Karjane et al. found that only 22.4% of schools specified the
burden of proof used in sexual assault cases (as compared with
thirty-five, or 97% here), and of those, 81.4% used preponderance
of the evidence (as compared with thirty-four, or 94% here); 3.3%
used beyond a reasonable doubt as compared with one, or 3%
here.121 They found that of the 203 public four-year universities that
mentioned who decided if a student had violated the code of conduct, 82.3% had judicial or disciplinary members make that decision
as opposed to one individual (as compared with twenty-one, or 58%
now).122 Of those universities that described their proceedings,
68.5% mentioned cross-examination (as compared with twentythree, or 63.8=64% now),123 but it was unclear whether that included
direct questioning of the complainant and/or whether the complainant had to actually respond.124 Furthermore, of the seventy-four
four-year public universities that mentioned the type of vote needed
for a finding of responsibility, 94.6% used majority; 1.4% were
unanimous, and the remaining 4.1% used something else.125 The
present study found that twelve, or 33%, of all schools used a majority vote to determine responsibility; three, or 8%, required consensus or unanimity, and ten, or 28%, had one person make the determination. Seven schools, 19%, used the investigatory model and
had two or more individuals determine responsibility, but it was unknown what their vote had to be. Four schools or 11% (one investigatory and three adjudicatory) were completely unknown.
The above comparison shows a mixed picture of how rights afforded to accused students have changed over time. For example,
119

Id. at vi.
Id. at vi–vii.
121
Id. at 122, table 6.12.
122
Id. at 121, table 6.11.
123
Id. at 118, table 6.9. Note that this article is classifying all schools with the
investigatory model as not allowing cross-examination. Suggesting questions to
an investigator who will decide whether to ask, and even if he does it will be
outside of the accused’s presence, does not qualify as cross-examination.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 122, table 6.12.
120
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some protections have been reduced because, in the past, more
schools afforded students the right to a hearing. The right to counsel,
in contrast, has clearly improved. Although students may not
currently have a robust right to an attorney, at least most schools
give students the right to have an attorney present as an advisor. Unfortunately, insufficient information exists to meaningfully analyze
either the right to confront/cross-examine or the standard of proof
over time. Karjane et al. found that 68.5% mentioned cross-examination, but they do not specify whether that means students at those
institutions had the right to ask questions and whether the complainant had to respond.126 If that is what their findings mean, then the
right has been significantly reduced. If they meant that students were
allowed to indirectly question the complainant who need not respond, then more schools now afford a limited right to cross-examine.127 In addition, this study found that more of the IHEs used a
lower standard of proof (preponderance).
III. CHALLENGING THESE PROCEEDINGS
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
forbids the deprivation of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”128 The Court has limited the reach of the Fourteenth
Amendment—and the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the federal
government129—through the “state action doctrine,”130 holding that

126

See KARJANE, ET AL., supra note 35, at 118, table 6.9.
See id.
128
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
129
In San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm.,
483 U.S. 522 (U.S. 1987), the SFAA argued that the USOC’s enforcement of its
exclusive right to use the word “Olympic” was discriminatory in violation of the
Fifth Amendment. Id. at 542. In analyzing this question, the Court wrote: “The
fundamental inquiry is whether the USOC is a governmental actor to whom the
prohibitions of the Constitution apply.” Id. The Court then applied the public
function test and the state compulsion test and concluded that the actions of the
USOC did not constitute state or governmental action by Congress. Id. at 542–
547.
130
Although the Civil Rights cases are often recognized as the “earliest state
action decision,” the Court discussed the doctrine in earlier cases. See GEOFFREY
R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1584 (5th ed. 2005); see also United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554–55 (1875) (“The fourteenth amendment
prohibits a State from denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro127
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“the prohibitions of the amendment are against State laws and acts
done under State authority.”131 In other words, if the conduct in
question is private, “the Amendment affords no shield, no matter
how unfair that conduct may be.”132 Importantly, the state action
doctrine also applies to the federal government, and “doctrine developed in the context of suits involving conduct by state and municipal bodies and officials is directly relevant.”133
Public universities are, of course, state actors; but private universities would seem not to be. Nevertheless, otherwise private conduct may fall within the ambit of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment if it qualifies as “state action.”134 Any university conduct that
amounts to state action is subject to the Fourteenth Amendment135
and renders the university liable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.136
Professor Charles Black called “the ‘state action’ problem . . .
the most important problem in American law.”137 Students hoping
to challenge the disciplinary proceedings of their private university
tection of the laws; but this provision does not, any more than the one which precedes it, and which we have just considered, add anything to the rights which one
citizen has under the Constitution against another.”); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S.
313, 318 (1879) (“The provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . have reference to State action exclusively, and not to any action of private individuals.”).
131
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (“It is State action of a particular
character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject matter of the amendment.”).
132
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988);
see also Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349–50 (1974).
133
Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 591 n.33 (1983) (“The phrase ‘state
action’ is used here in its generic sense, to refer to action by any level of government, from local to national . . . At issue in the present case is action by officials
of the federal government, but doctrine developed in the context of suits involving
conduct by state and municipal bodies and officials is directly relevant.”).
134
See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1012 (1982).
135
See id.
136
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2012).
137
Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: “State Action,” Equal Protection, and
California’s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 69 (1967).
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would undoubtedly agree. For the state action question is a “threshold” one; unless state action is present, the Court will not even reach
the constitutionality of the challenged act or policy.138 There is good
reason to believe that if state action could be shown, plaintiffs might
well prevail on the merits.139 In a companion article, this Author argues that students facing expulsion from state universities for sexual
assault are entitled to procedural due process due to the considerable
liberty and property interests at stake.140 That article then employs
the balancing test from Matthews v. Eldridge to evaluate whether
the proceedings (similar to those used here) comport with due process and concludes they do not.141 Consequently, the state action
question has great practical significance.
A. Is There State Action?
State action doctrine is notoriously difficult.142 Even the Supreme Court has acknowledged as much, writing, “[t]his Court has
never attempted the ‘impossible task’ of formulating an infallible
test for determining whether the State ‘in any of its manifestations’
has become significantly involved in private discriminations.”143
The Court explained that “[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private
conduct be attributed its true significance.”144 It should come as no
surprise then that critics have called the state action doctrine incoherent,145 a “conceptual disaster area,”146 and a “‘doctrine’ without
138

Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Emerging Threshold Approach to State Action
Determinations: Trying to Make Sense of Flagg Brothers, Inc. v Brooks, 69 GEO.
L.J. 745, 747 (1981).
139
See id. at 746.
140
See Lave, supra note 37, at 669.
141
See id. at 696.
142
See State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 123 HARV. L. REV.
1248, 1255 (2010); see also Julie K. Brown, Less is More: Decluttering the State
Action Doctrine, 73 MO. L. REV. 561, 561–62 (2008); Martin A. Schwartz & Erwin Chemerinsky, Dialogue on State Action, 16 TOURO L. REV. 775, 775–76
(2000).
143
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967) (citation omitted).
144
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
145
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 503,
548–49 (1985).
146
Henry J. Friendly, The Public-Private Penumbra—Fourteen Years Later,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289, 1290 (1982).
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shape or line . . . [that] has the flavor of a torchless search for a way
out of a damp echoing cave.”147 Part of the problem with distinguishing between private and state action is that “the state always
acts—at least in the sense that its courts resolve the resulting dispute
according to a state policy.”148 As Professors Tushnet and Peller
write, “[e]very exercise of ‘private’ rights in a liberal legal order
depends on the potential exercise of state power to prevent other
private actors from interfering with the rights holder.”149
The confounding nature of the state action doctrine makes it all
the more important to carefully define what is at issue here. The action in question is not the university’s determination of responsibility in a particular case. Rather, it is the university’s decision to lower
procedural protections in sexual assault cases.150 If that action could
be shown to constitute “state action,” a properly pled § 1983 claim
(including matters such as standing) might be brought against the
university on the ground that it had violated procedural due process
rights under the Constitution.151
In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., the Court explained that
it would be appropriate to attribute the actions of a private party to
that of the state only when “there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so
that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State
itself.”152 The question of what factors might justify a conclusion
that a university’s decision to lower procedural protections should
be treated as state action is complex. The fact that universities depend heavily on federal funding—funding provided on conditions—
is relevant, but is not in itself sufficient to result in a finding of state
action.153 The Court has held that government regulation on its own,
147

Black, supra note 137, at 95.
Rowe, supra note 138, at 746 (emphasis added).
149
Gary Peller & Mark Tushnet, State Action and a New Birth of Freedom, 92
GEO. L.J. 779, 789 (2004); but see Lillian BeVier & John Harrison, The State
Action Principle and Its Critics, 96 VA. L. REV. 1767, 1792 (2010) (“The [state
action] principle does not turn on the presence or absence of government power.
It turns, instead, on whether a choice by a government actor qua government actor
or a private actor qua private actor invokes the application of that power.”).
150
See Lave, supra note 37, at 657–58.
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See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 145, at 550–51.
152
Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1975).
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See generally id. at 352.
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even “‘extensive and detailed’” state regulation, is not enough to
constitute state action.154 Furthermore, in a series of cases, the Court
has held that a monetary relationship is inadequate on its own to
establish the necessary connection. For instance, in Blum v.
Yaretsky, the Court held that dependence of nursing homes on government funding did not transform the actions of doctors and nursing
home administrators into the actions of the state.155 That same year
in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, the Court declined to find state action
even though the school in question received 90% of its funding, and
in one year 99%, from public funds.156
How, then, might a nexus be shown sufficient to qualify a university’s decision to lower procedural protections as state action?
Before proceeding, it is important to acknowledge that this Article
makes no claim of providing a comprehensive account of the state
action doctrine. The goal is only to give a preliminary account of
how state action might be shown. With that caveat in mind, of the
various tests used to determine state action, two seem most plausible.157 One is the public function exception to the state action doctrine, which reflects the sense among critics of the DCL that universities’ adjudication of sexual assault claims fulfills a function, or has
some effects, similar in important respects to prosecution of criminal
charges.158 The other is state compulsion, reflecting the charge that
the decision to adopt lower procedural safeguards reflects the overwhelming pressure imposed by the threat of a funding cut-off by
DOE.159
154

See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 841 (1982) (citations omitted).
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1005 (1982).
156
Rendall-Baker, 457 U.S. at 832.
157
See Brown, supra note 142, at 564–68 (discussing the different tests the
Supreme Court has used in determining state action). Although Brown distinguishes seven different tests (public function, state compulsion, nexus, state
agency, entwinement, symbiotic relationship, and joint participation), Erwin
Chemerinsky has reduced them down to three: public function, entanglement, and
entwinement. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES, 527–28 (Aspen, 3d. ed. 2006).
158
See Brown, supra note 142, at 565.
159
Id. at 565–66. See FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN EDUC., FIRE’S
GUIDE TO DUE PROCESS AND CAMPUS JUSTICE 3, 5–7 (2003), https://www.thefire.
org/fire-guides/fires-guide-to-due-process-and-campus-justice/fires-guide-to-due
-process-and-fair-procedure-on-campus-full-text/ [hereinafter FIRE’S GUIDE].
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1. PUBLIC FUNCTION
Under the public function exception to the state action doctrine,
a private party must comply with the Constitution if it is performing
a task that has “traditionally [been] exclusively reserved to the
State.”160 Although the Court has held that the management of private property can meet the public function exception,161 it has never
held that the actions of a private school constitute state action under
this exception.162
In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, the Petitioner sued for damages under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.163 The Petitioner contended that her rights under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments were violated when she was
dismissed without a hearing from the private school where she was
employed after she supported a student proposal that had been denied by the director of the school.164 The Court agreed with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit that the Petitioner was not entitled to pursue this claim against the respondents because they had
not acted under the color of state law when they fired her.165 The
Court held that it was not enough for the private party to be serving
a public function (here providing an education), but that this function must be one that has “‘traditionally [been] the exclusive prerogative of the State.’”166 The Court wrote that even though it was clear
from Chapter 766 of the Massachusetts Acts of 1972 that the state
intended to educate maladjusted high school students, this “legislative policy choice in no way makes these services the exclusive
province of the State.”167 As proof of this, the Court pointed out that
“until recently[,] the State had not undertaken to provide education
for students who could not be served by traditional public
schools.”168
160

Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974).
See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 302 (1966); Marsh v. Ala., 326 U.S.
501, 506 (1946).
162
See, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191–
94 (1988); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 841–43 (1982).
163
Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 835.
164
Id. at 835, 842.
165
Id. at 837.
166
Id. at 842 (citing Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)).
167
Id.
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Id.
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Six years later, in Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian,
Jerry Tarkanian, the basketball coach at the University of Nevada,
Las Vegas, sued the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(“NCAA”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.169 He argued that his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated when he
was not afforded a fair hearing before being suspended.170 The Court
held that Tarkanian was not entitled to damages under § 1983 because the NCAA was not a state actor and thus was not required to
comply with the Fourteenth Amendment.171 Although the Court
acknowledged that regulating college athletics was a critical function, it held that it was not the exclusive (or even the traditional)
function of the state.172
Just as with college athletics, disciplinary proceedings are not
the exclusive (or even the traditional) function of the state.173 To the
contrary, universities are entitled to decide what constitutes a violation of their code of conduct, regardless of whether it would be a
crime in state or federal court.174 In addition, at least regarding nonsex offenses, they have significant leeway in determining how they
determine whether a violation occurred.175 They certainly do not
need to afford all the same protections that would be required in
criminal court, such as the right to a jury trial and a standard of proof
set at beyond a reasonable doubt.176 Thus, it is clear that under the
public function test, the involvement of the government in college
disciplinary proceedings does not constitute state action.
2. STATE COMPULSION
Under the state compulsion exception to the state action doctrine, a private party must comply with the Constitution if the state
has exercised such coercive power over the conduct at issue that the
“choice must in law be deemed to be that of the state.”177
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177

Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 180–81 (1988).
Id.
Id. at 181–82.
Id. at 198 n.18.
See, e.g., id.
See FIRE’S GUIDE, supra note 159, at 3.
See id.
See id. at 5–6.
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
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In Blum v. Yaretsky, Respondents Yaretsky and Cuevas were
Medicaid recipients who argued that their procedural due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment had been violated when
they were transferred from a nursing home to a lower level of care
without notice or a hearing.178 The Court held that there was no state
action because the decision had been made by a private organization
(specifically the doctors and administrators at the nursing home),
and the state was only responding to that decision.179 Justice
Rehnquist authored the majority opinion, which set forth the test for
state compulsion: “[A] State normally can be held responsible for a
private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has
provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that
the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State.”180
Later, in Logan v. Bennington College, the Second Circuit held
that there was no state action when Logan was dismissed from his
job as a drama professor pursuant to a sexual harassment policy that
was written by the Vermont Human Rights Commission.181 The
court noted that Bennington College had enacted the policy in an
unrelated case, and although the state helped craft the policy, it was
Bennington’s sole decision to find Logan responsible and then dismiss him.182
The state compulsion exception, as applied to the Dear Colleague Letter, was recently litigated in Doe v. Washington & Lee
Univ.183 Doe had argued that Washington & Lee’s disciplinary proceedings constituted state action because the 2011 Dear Colleague
Letter led directly to the university’s decision to discipline him.184
Although the court found that it was “plausible that W & L was under pressure to convict students accused of sexual assault in order to
demonstrate that the school was in compliance,” that alone was not
enough to constitute state action.185 Instead, the court held that Doe
would have to show that “the government deprived W & L of its
178

Id. at 993.
Id. at 1005–12.
180
Id. at 1004–05.
181
Logan v. Bennington Coll. Corp., 72 F.3d 1017, 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1995).
182
Id. at 1027–28.
183
See generally Doe v. Wash. & Lee Univ., No. 6:14–CV–00052, 2015 WL
4647996 (W.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2015).
184
Id. at *9.
185
Id.
179
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autonomy to investigate and adjudicate charges [or] . . . that the government participated in the decision-making process at any stage of
the proceedings.”186 The court found that the state had not “drafted
the disciplinary code, nor participated in determining what sentence
was to be handed out under it.”187 Because the state wasn’t more
directly involved, the court held that there was no state action.188
Washington & Lee can be distinguished from the claim discussed in this Article. The plaintiff in Washington & Lee alleged that
the outcome of his particular case represented state action.189 This
paper, in contrast, contends that a university’s decision to lower procedural protections for all students charged with sexual assault is
state action. Thus, this Article is focused on the proceedings in general instead of the outcome of a particular case.
Although both Logan and Doe failed to show that there was state
action, a student might have more success by citing two cases decided over forty years ago.190 In Powe v. Miles, the Second Circuit
held that state regulation of educational standards at Alfred University was not enough to transform Alfred’s acts in curtailing protest
and disciplining students into those of the state.191 Judge Friendly
authored the opinion and wrote that “the state must be involved not
simply with some activity of the institution alleged to have inflicted
injury upon a plaintiff but with the activity that caused the injury.”192
Although the actions of Alfred University did not constitute state
action, Judge Friendly explained what would have: “State action
would be . . . present here with respect to all the students if New
York had undertaken to set policy for the control of demonstrations
in all private universities . . . .”193
In Coleman v. Wagner College, students sought to apply dicta
from Judge Friendly’s opinion in asserting that their expulsion for
demonstrating against the Vietnam War constituted state action.194
186

Id.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
See id.; see also Logan v. Bennington Coll. Corp., 72 F.3d 1017, 1028–29
(2d Cir. 1995).
191
Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 1968).
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
Coleman v. Wagner Coll., 429 F.2d 1120, 1123 (2d Cir. 1970).
187
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They contended that by enacting § 6450, the New York legislature
undertook to create policy for handling campus demonstrations and,
in so doing, became involved in the regulation of the activity that
caused the students to be unjustly injured.195 Although the Second
Circuit found that § 6450 “was devoid of meaningful content” in
terms of providing specific guidance on how universities should
handle campus demonstrations, the court still found that it could
constitute state action:196
We are, however, cognizant of the possibility that the
statute may have been intended, or may be applied,
to mean more than it purports to say. More specifically, section 6450 may be intended or applied as a
command to the colleges of the state to adopt a new,
more severe attitude toward campus disruption and
to impose harsh sanctions on unruly students. The
Governor’s Memorandum approving section 6450
referred to an ‘intolerable situation on the Cornell
University Campus’ and spoke of ‘the urgent need
for adequate plans for student-university relations.’
Several other bills pending in the New York legislature while section 6450 was under consideration suggest that the statute was enacted in an atmosphere of
hostility toward unruly student demonstrators and of
resolve to make disruption costly for the participants.
If these considerations have merit and section 6450
was intended to coerce colleges to adopt disciplinary
codes embodying a ‘hard-line’ attitude toward student protesters, it would appear that New York has
indeed ‘undertaken to set policy for the control of
demonstrations in all private universities’ and should
be held responsible for the implementation of this
policy.197

195
196
197

Id. at 1123.
Id. at 1124.
Id. at 1124–25 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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The Second Circuit then remanded the case for a determination
of whether there was state action.198 In so doing, it alerted the District Court to some factors it deemed “of particular importance.”199
“Most significant” were the actions of the state officials:200
If these officials were to regard their function as
more than a ministerial task, and, as an illustration,
believed themselves empowered to prevent regulations from being filed because of substantive ‘inadequacies,’ or exercised any other influence upon the
content of regulations filed pursuant to Section 6450,
they would provide strong indicia of state action.201
The Second Circuit also directed the District Court to look into
the attitude of the campus administrators that drafted regulations
pursuant to § 6450.202 Although the court said it would “ordinarily
be loath” to find that state action could arise from the mistaken beliefs of a private individual, “[a] reasonable and widespread belief
among college administrators . . . that section 6450 required them to
adopt a particular stance toward campus demonstrators would seem
to justify a conclusion that the state intended for them to pursue that
course of action. And this intent, if present, would provide a basis
for a finding of state action.203 The Second Circuit then suggested
one way of discerning the attitude of college administrators towards
§ 6450:
The universal adoption of noticeably more stringent
standards governing student disruption following the
statute’s enactment or an attempt by administrators
to attribute the imposition of harsh penalties to the
command of the state would give support to the contention that the statute constitutes significant state intervention in the area of campus discipline.204
198
199
200
201
202
203
204

Id. at 1125.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Applying the reasoning from Powe and Coleman, students have
a strong case that disciplinary proceedings implemented in response
to the Dear Colleague Letter constitute state action. The Department
of Education told universities that they had to make certain enumerated changes to their disciplinary proceedings, including lowering
the standard of proof to preponderance of the evidence, or risk losing
federal funding.205 Since then, the DOE has actively policed universities to make sure they are doing what they are supposed to, published a list of schools under investigation, and found that at least
two schools were in violation.206 In addition, after the DCL, there is
evidence that there was a universal adoption of more stringent standards—with schools lowering their standards of proof and changing
their disciplinary processes in ways that make it easier to find someone responsible of sexual assault.207 To make this case fully, a student would have to do an empirical study akin to this one, but that
was focused more on whether universities made changes to their
policies in response to the DCL.
Although Powe and Coleman are still good law, a court might
be unwilling to follow Judge Friendly’s more expansive notion of
state action on the ground that it has been foreclosed by the Supreme
Court’s decision in Blum v. Yaretsky.208 Even so, there is still a way
that a student could succeed. As Doe v. Washington & Lee indicates,
the Court’s decision in Blum would make it difficult for a student to
challenge a particular finding of fault, but a student might be more
successful if he challenged the university disciplinary proceedings
at a more general level.209
The argument would look like this: OCR has exercised the kind
of coercive power over university disciplinary proceedings to turn
the private actions of private colleges and universities into those of
the state. As detailed above, OCR specifically told schools to change
their policies, and threatened schools with termination of federal

205

See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 8.
See id.; DOE List, supra note 13; Princeton Violation, supra note 14; Harvard Violation, supra note 15.
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See generally FIRE’S GUIDE, supra note 158.
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See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004–05 (1982).
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See Doe v. Wash. & Lee Univ., No. 6:14–CV–00052, 2015 WL 4647996,
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funds if they did not comply.210 OCR further tightened the screws
by publishing a list of schools under investigation even though there
was no finding of fact required to make the list.211 The DOE did this
even though such a list would violate Title VII and DOJ policy.212
This Article contends that the combination of threatening to withdraw federal funds unless universities took specific actions and then
publishing a list of those under investigation for not having done so
was sufficiently coercive to constitute state action.
3. STANDING
A court would not hear the constitutional claim unless the plaintiff had standing.213 Like state action doctrine, the law of standing is
complex and not always predictable, but the Supreme Court has recognized three constitutional standing requirements.214 First, the
plaintiff must allege a personal injury—one that is imminent and
actual, rather than hypothetical or speculative.215 The injury must
210

See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 8.
See DOE List, supra note 13.
212
See Letter from Senator James Lankford, supra note 25, at 1–3.
213
See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013).
214
See id. at 1147.
215
See id. (“To establish Article III standing, an injury must be ‘concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
redressable by a favorable ruling.’ ‘Although imminence is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure
that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the injury is certainly impending.’ Thus, we have repeatedly reiterated that ‘threatened
injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact,’ and that ‘[a]llegations of possible future injury’ are not sufficient.”) (citations omitted). See also
Lujan v. Def’s of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“Over the years, our cases
have established that . . . the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized
and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’”) (internal citations
and quotations omitted); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (“Like the
prudential component, the constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates concepts concededly not susceptible of precise definition. The injury alleged must be, for example, distinct and palpable, and not abstract or conjectural
or hypothetical[.]”) (internal citations omitted); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95, 101–102 (1983) (“It goes without saying that those who seek to invoke
the jurisdiction of the federal courts must satisfy the threshold requirement imposed by Art. III of the Constitution by alleging an actual case or controversy.
Plaintiffs must demonstrate ‘a personal stake in the outcome’ in order to ‘assure
211
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also be “fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.”216
The Supreme Court has long made clear that “injury” under the
standing doctrine is defined capaciously.217 The term is “not confined to those who [can] show ‘economic harm[.]’”218 The Court has
recognized harm to “aesthetic and recreational values”219 as well as
“‘conservational’” values220 and “First Amendment values.”221 The
Court has also held that a person has suffered an injury-in-fact when
he has been “prevented from . . . competing on an equal footing”222
or if he is a member of a disfavored group that is “stigmatiz[ed] . . .
as ‘innately inferior.’”223 Finally, in 2016 the Court explicitly recognized that an “intangible injury” could establish standing as long
as it is also “concrete.”224

that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues’ necessary for
the proper resolution of constitutional questions. Abstract injury is not enough.
The plaintiff must show that he ‘has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury’ as the result of the challenged official conduct and the
injury or threat of injury must be both ‘real and immediate,’ not ‘conjectural or
hypothetical.’”) (internal citations omitted).
216
Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
217
See United States v. Students Challenging Reg. Agency Procedures, 412
U.S. 669, 686 (1973).
218
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219
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.
167, 183 (2000).
220
Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154
(1970) (citing Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FCC, 354 F.2d 608, 616
(2d Cir. 1965)).
221
Id.
222
Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 667 (1993).
223
Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739 (1984) (citation omitted).
224
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016). Rachel Bayesfsky
has written that “intangible injury” should also include psychological injury. See
generally Rachel Bayefsky, Psychological Harm and Constitutional Standing, 81
BROOKLYN L. REV. 1555, 1557–58 (2016). Although Bayefsky acknowledges the
refusal of at least some members of the Court to give standing to “psychic injury,”
she points out that the Court already implicitly recognizes the role psychological
injury plays in establishing injury in fact. Id. at 1579, n.109. Bayesky writes, “the
harmful nature of these intangible injuries seems to stem at least partially from
their psychological effects on plaintiffs.” Id. at 1558.
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In a case against a university, the asserted violation—a matter of
the merits—would be the university’s lowered procedural protections below the minimum required by the Constitution. The capaciousness of “injury” under the standing doctrine means that a student might claim to be injured by this violation in either or both of
two ways. The first is the most obvious. A student could claim that
he has suffered practical and stigmatic injuries from the imposition
of a penalty such as suspension or expulsion (or the imminent possibility of such a penalty if a hearing was scheduled or under way).
The second is subtler. A student could claim that he has suffered the
inhibiting effect—whether on forming relationships or expressing
views—from the prospect of being subjected to a hearing with procedural protections that fall below the constitutional minimum.
Although the first type of injury seems preferable because it is
more concrete, it might be in tension with the underlying claim on
the merits. That is, framing the claim as a challenge to the university’s decision to lower the procedural protections in all sexual assault cases—as opposed to the university’s decision regarding guilt
in a particular case—while helpful in dealing with state action issues, might create difficulties for the second and third components
of standing where the alleged injury is expulsion or suspension. A
court that vigorously applied the “causation” component of the
standing doctrine might conclude that the simple act of lowering the
procedural protections did not necessarily cause the expulsion or
suspension. Would a plaintiff have to demonstrate that with stronger
procedural protections he would not have been found liable? That
might be very difficult to prove. But some of the Court’s standing
cases might suggest such a requirement.225 In other cases involving
225
See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 759 (1984) (“The chain of causation is
even weaker in this case. It involves numerous third parties (officials of racially
discriminatory schools receiving tax exemptions and the parents of children attending such schools) who may not even exist in respondents’ communities and
whose independent decisions may not collectively have a significant effect on the
ability of public school students to receive a desegregated education.”); see also
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–102 (1983); Simon v. E. Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42–43 (1976) (“It is purely speculative
whether the denials of service specified in the complaint fairly can be traced to
petitioners ‘encouragement’ or instead result from decisions made by the hospitals
without regard to the tax implications.”); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614,
618 (1973) (“[I]f appellant were granted the requested relief, it would result only
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challenges to universities’ use of affirmative action, however, the
Court has not applied such a demanding test.226 These later cases
suggest that a plaintiff might establish causation by framing the injury not as the outcome—i.e., expulsion or suspension—but as being subjected to unlawful procedures. The injury, in other words,
would be the use of procedures that violate due process to determine
whether the plaintiff would be permitted to continue his education.
Thus framed, the injury would be directly caused by the constitutional violation being alleged and would be fully redressed by a ruling that the procedures were unconstitutional.
As for the second type of injury, a student who has not been
sanctioned might nevertheless still have a claim. He might, for example, allege that although his university allows him to engage in
consensual romantic and sexual relationships,227 he is so afraid of
being unable to fully and fairly defend himself should he be wrongfully accused of sexual assault that he is avoiding romantic relationships.228 Making matters worse, the standards of affirmative defense
and coercion are so vague that he isn’t even sure what constitutes
sexual assault. As a result, he is avoiding sex altogether. Since a
2013 Facebook study found that 28% of people married someone
they met in college,229 the student worries that the disciplinary proceeding is undermining his best chance of finding a spouse.

in the jailing of the child’s father. The prospect that prosecution will, at least in
the future, result in payment of support can, at best, be termed only speculative.
Certainly the ‘direct’ relationship between the alleged injury and the claim sought
to be adjudicated, which previous decisions of this Court suggest is a prerequisite
of standing, is absent in this case.”).
226
See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 260–69 (2003); see also Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290–311 (1978); Ne. Fla. Chapter of
Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 662–68
(1993).
227
A student at a school that explicitly banned students from engaging in sexual or romantic relationships would not be able to make this argument.
228
To be clear, this Article is not arguing that the chilling effect of a private
university’s disciplinary proceedings is the same as the state outlawing certain
kinds of intimate conduct.
229
Sofus Attila Macskassy, From Classmates to Soulmates, FACEBOOK (Oct.
7, 2013 11:41 AM), https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-data-science/fr
om-classmates-to-soulmates/10151779448773859/.
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The student could also allege that the unfair proceedings have
made him reluctant to have even platonic friendships, which is relevant for students matriculating at schools where sex and dating are
forbidden.230 His ability to learn and to succeed academically has
also been impaired because he refuses to do group projects with only
one other student unless witnesses are present. Indeed, his fear of
biased and unfair proceedings has made him reluctant to do laboratory work where he would be working in a confined space with another student, and he worries that not doing so will derail his lifelong
dream of becoming a doctor. Overall, the student’s fear of being
falsely accused and unable to adequately defend himself has caused
deep unhappiness and undermined his sense of community and connection to his classmates. It has also negatively impacted his education and future success.
An injury to the plaintiff’s ability to form relationships, whether
romantic or platonic, would seem to comport with the Court’s generally expansive conception of injuries. If “[a]esthetic and environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are important ingredients of the quality of life in our society,”231 certainly the same is true
of emotional and intellectual well-being. In Lawrence v. Texas, the
Court discussed the significance of sexual intimacy, calling it the
“most private human conduct”232 and saying that it “involv[es] the
most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, [which] are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”233 More
recently, in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court explicitly recognized
the value of “expression, intimacy, and spirituality” in holding that
same sex couples had the right to marry.234
The Court has also “long recognized that, given the important
purpose of public education and the expansive freedoms of speech
and thought associated with the university environment, universities

230

This Article is not contending that a private school does not have the right
to demand that its students refrain from engaging in sexual or romantic conduct.
231
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972).
232
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
233
Id. at 574.
234
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015).
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occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition.”235 If a disciplinary policy is chilling student speech, isn’t that interfering with
the “robust exchange of ideas,” which is of “paramount importance
in the fulfillment of [the university’s] mission”?236 Indeed, isn’t such
a policy causing harm not just to the student who is afraid to participate, but also to the university as a whole?
There might be some uncertainty, however, about the success of
claims by students whose asserted injury was inhibition of relationships or expression. On the one hand, and ironically, the causation
issues discussed above might be easier to handle in such cases than
in cases where the student claimed an expulsion or suspension or
some other sanction as the injury. The plaintiff would assert that
what was inhibiting him from forming relationships was his fear of
being subjected to a process with standards that had been lowered
through state action in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
causation would appear quite direct.
On the other hand, at least in Clapper, the Court seemed wary of
injuries that it viewed as self-inflicted or manufactured for the purposes of creating standing.237 There, plaintiffs alleged that the federal government was engaging in illegal surveillance of some of
their conversations, and that as a result, the plaintiffs had been
forced to “take costly and burdensome measures to protect the confidentiality of their communications.”238 The Court responded that
plaintiffs could not “manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm
on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm that
is not certainly impending.”239 Clapper may not be representative of
the broad thrust of the Court’s standing doctrine, as Justice Breyer
suggested in his dissenting opinion,240 but it does raise the prospect
that a court might conclude that a student who said he was refraining
from certain activities was simply manufacturing standing.

235

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003).
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312–13 (1978).
237
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S.Ct. 1138, 1150–51 (2013).
238
Id. at 1151.
239
Id.
240
Id. at 1161 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“More important, the Court’s holdings
in standing cases show that standing exists here. The Court has often found standing where the occurrence of the relevant injury was far less certain than here.”).
236

418

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:377

If a student is able to establish standing, and if he is able to convince the court that there is state action and that the school’s disciplinary proceedings violate procedural due process, then he would
be able to sue for damages under § 1983.241 More importantly, he
would also be able to request a preliminary injunction that would
bar the university from using its current disciplinary proceedings
until a court ruled that they adequately protected the procedural due
process rights of accused students.242
B. Alternative Argument if State Action Cannot Be Established
Without the Fourteenth Amendment limiting what is permissible, it will be harder to challenge these disciplinary proceedings in
court. Yet, students still have three major avenues of attack. The first
two are essentially contractual; students can argue that their contractual rights with the university have been explicitly breached, and
that the proceedings violate their implicit right to “fundamental” 243
or “basic fairness.”244 They can also argue that their right to gender
equality under Title IX entitles them to better procedures. Each will
be briefly discussed below.
1. CONTRACT
The student/college relationship is “essentially contractual in nature,”245 which means that students can sue for breach of contract if
the university is not meeting its procedural obligations. Contract disputes are governed by state as opposed to constitutional law. In determining the terms of the contract, courts can look at statements
from student manuals,246 registration materials,247 brochures, and
241
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other advertisements.248 To determine whether there has been a
breach, courts must consider what is a “reasonable expectation” of
interpretation for the contractual terms.249 In other words, courts
must ask, “what meaning the party making the manifestation, the
university, should reasonably expect the other party to give it.”250
Recently, students have achieved some success challenging their
punishment on contractual grounds. In Doe v. Brandeis University,
the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts conducted
a detailed analysis of Doe’s breach of contract claim and found that
Doe had alleged sufficient evidence to survive a dismissal for insufficiency of the evidence.251 The grounds included that Brandeis allegedly failed to provide Doe with a copy of the Special Examiner’s
Report and that it failed to maintain confidentiality of his educational record.252 Several months later, in Doe v. Brown University,
the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island found that
Brown had breached Doe’s contractual rights by using the wrong
definition of consent.253 Although the alleged incident had taken
place in 2014, Brown used a definition of consent from the revised
2015–2016 Title IX policy, which included “manipulation” as a
ground for lack of consent.254 The court held that Doe had proved
by a preponderance of the evidence that Brown breached its contract
with Doe by the manner in which it conducted his disciplinary hearing, and thus he was entitled to a new hearing.255
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2. BASIC FAIRNESS
Although private schools need not comply with the Constitution,
they do not have a free pass to trample students’ procedural rights.256
The Supreme Court has never directly ruled on what constitutes fairness in private disciplinary proceedings, but lower courts have set a
low bar.257 If the school is complying with its own rules and procedures, courts are likely to find the proceedings fair.258 Some courts
will only intervene when the proceedings are “arbitrary and capricious.”259 Other courts explicitly require the proceedings to comply
with “fundamental” fairness.260 In other words, they don’t just look
to see whether the university provided students with the procedural
safeguards it specifically contracted to, but they “examine the hearing to ensure that it was conducted with basic fairness.”261 Despite
these hurdles, students have seen some success in challenging these
procedures.262
In Doe v. Brandeis University, Doe sued Brandeis University for
various causes of action related to him being found guilty of sexual
misconduct under the university’s procedures for such cases.263
Brandeis filed a motion to dismiss, and the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts was asked to consider
whether Doe had filed sufficient information to proceed.264 The

256
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court began its analysis by acknowledging that the Sixth Amendment does not bind Brandeis, but even so, its “authority to discipline
its students is not entirely without limits.”265 The court wrote that
Brandeis had to afford its students “basic fairness” or what the court
called, “some minimum level of fair play.”266 The court went on:
“Put simply, a fair determination of the facts requires a fair process,
not tilted to favor a particular outcome, and a fair and neutral factfinder, not predisposed to reach a particular conclusion.”267 Importantly, the court noted that Brandeis had an obligation to provide
basic fairness in its proceedings which was “separate from and in
addition to its contractual obligation” to abide by the rules enumerated in the university handbook.268
The court then provided a detailed account of all of Brandeis’
procedural failings.269 It noted that Doe had not been given a “full
account” of what he had allegedly done wrong;270 was not allowed
to have a lawyer to assist him in either an active or a passive capacity;271 was not given the right to confront his accuser, which some
found particularly troubling because “the entire investigation . . .
turned on the credibility of the accuser and the accused” and
“[u]nder the circumstances, the lack of an opportunity for cross-examination may have had a very substantial effect on the fairness of
the proceeding”;272 was not given the right to cross-examine the witnesses who the Special Examiner questioned and relied on in some
degree in her report;273 and was denied the right to an effective appeal because he could not challenge the decision because it was “not
supported by the evidence or that it was otherwise unfair, unwise, or
simply wrong.”274
The court also was troubled by the fact that Brandeis used a single investigator process, similar to that of six of the schools studied
here, in which one person investigates the case and determines
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
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guilt.275 The court wrote: “The dangers of combining in a single individual the power to investigate, prosecute, and convict with little
effective power of review are obvious. No matter how well-intentioned, such a person may have preconceptions and biases, may
make mistakes, and may reach premature conclusions.”276
Finally, the court was concerned by the fact that Brandeis used
a lower standard of proof in sexual assault hearings than any other
kind of violation, which it found particularly problematic in light of
the elimination of other basic procedural rights of the accused:
The standard of proof in sexual misconduct cases at
Brandeis is proof by a “preponderance of the evidence.” For virtually all other forms of alleged misconduct at Brandeis, the more demanding standard of
proof by “clear and convincing evidence” is employed. The selection of a lower standard (presumably, at the insistence of the United States Department
of Education) is not problematic, standing alone; that
standard is commonly used in civil proceedings,
even to decide matters of great importance. Here,
however, the lowering of the standard appears to
have been a deliberate choice by the university to
make cases of sexual misconduct easier to prove—
and thus more difficult to defend, both for guilty and
innocent students alike. It retained the higher standard for virtually all other forms of student misconduct. The lower standard may thus be seen, in context, as part of an effort to tilt the playing field against
accused students, which is particularly troublesome
in light of the elimination of other basic rights of the
accused.277
For all these reasons, the court held that Doe had raised sufficient information to survive a motion to dismiss.278
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3. TITLE IX
Title IX provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on
the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance[.]”279 Although Title IX was aimed at protecting the rights of women, the
language is gender neutral, and male students are starting to use it to
challenge student disciplinary proceedings.280
In Yusuf, the Second Circuit set forth a framework for determining whether a school’s disciplinary proceeding violates a student’s
rights under Title IX.281 Yusuf distinguished between two different
theories of liability under Title IX: “erroneous outcome” and “selective enforcement.”282 As the court in Yusuf explained, a student filing a challenge under an “erroneous outcome” theory must meet two
requirements:
Plaintiffs who claim that an erroneous outcome was
reached must allege particular facts sufficient to cast
some articulable doubt on the accuracy of the outcome of the disciplinary proceeding . . . . A plaintiff
must thus also allege particular circumstances suggesting that gender bias was a motivating factor behind the erroneous finding.283
The selective enforcement claim, on the other hand, asserts that
“regardless of the student’s guilt or innocence, the severity of the
penalty and/or the decision to initiate the proceeding was affected
by the student’s gender.”284
Recently, courts have indicated receptivity to attacking disciplinary proceedings on Title IX grounds.285 In 2014, John Doe sued
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Washington & Lee for five causes of action stemming from his expulsion for non-consensual sexual intercourse.286 Washington & Lee
moved to dismiss, but the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, Lynchburg Division, denied that motion in
part, finding that Doe had pled sufficient factual allegations to support a Title IX claim.287 The court wrote:
Plaintiff’s allegations, taken as true, suggest that W
& L’s disciplinary procedures, at least when it comes
to charges of sexual misconduct, amount to ‘a practice of railroading accused students’ . . . .Given these
allegations, as well as Plaintiff’s charge that W & L
was under pressure from the government to convict
male students of sexual assault, a reasonable fact
finder could plausibly determine that Plaintiff was
wrongly found responsible for sexual misconduct
and that this erroneous finding was motivated by
gender bias.288
In July 2016, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals also held that
sufficient evidence had been presented to go forward on a gender
bias claim.289 John Doe sued Columbia University for violating Title
IX by practicing gender bias against him after the university investigated and suspended him for sexual assault.290 The District Court
originally dismissed the case for making an insufficient claim, but
the Second Circuit reversed and remanded on the ground that there
was enough evidence to show gender bias.291
A few months earlier, in February, a Senior United States Judge
partially denied a motion to dismiss in Cornell.292 The court held
that “[g]iven the totality of the circumstances . . . Plaintiff plausibly
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establishe[d] a causal connection between gender bias and the outcome of the disciplinary proceeding.”293 The court thus denied Cornell’s motion to dismiss on Title IX grounds.294
CONCLUSION
As this Article has shown, the top American colleges and universities do not give students what would be considered fundamental rights in the criminal context. Because universities are rightfully
being pressured to take rape more seriously, it is especially important that accused students are treated fairly. Although accused
students do not face prison time, they do face expulsion, which can
forever derail their chance of success.295 With stakes this high, universities should have a fair procedure that, at a minimum, requires a
robust right to counsel, an adjudicatory hearing with direct questioning, the right to evidence, and a standard of proof set at clear and
convincing evidence.296 Anything less poses the risk that innocent
men and women will be found responsible for offenses they did not
commit.
Challenging these laws will not be easy. In general, students at
private schools are afforded fewer procedural protections than those
at public universities.297 Ironically, the Department of Education’s
heavy handedness in forcing universities to comply with the Dear
Colleague Letter is what may enable students to successfully challenge these procedures as depriving them of procedural due process.298 Indeed, this Article has argued that because of the coercive
actions of the DOE, private schools have become state actors, which
means that students there are entitled to the same constitutional
rights as students at a public university.
Even if state action claims fail, students have successfully challenged campus disciplinary proceedings on other grounds. They
293
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have shown that universities are violating their contractual obligations, and they have argued convincingly that disciplinary proceedings violate their right to “basic fairness” and equal treatment under
Title IX.
The advent of a new administration often provides the opportunity for reconsideration of existing policies, particularly where
they have come under criticism by courts. The issuance of new regulations or guidance through proper administrative procedures that
take appropriate account of the issues of fundamental procedural
fairness outlined in this Article (and developed more fully in its
companion piece, Ready, Fire, Aim)299 would be a welcome development.
There are worrying signs, however, that the Trump administration may change course in harmful ways.300 This Author has argued
here and elsewhere that ensuring basic procedural fairness to the accused is fully compatible with—indeed, supportive of—treating the
issue of campus sexual assault as a serious problem urgently in need
of redress.301 Federal action pressing universities to enforce the
guarantees of Title IX is entirely appropriate, so long as basic procedural rights inherent in the Constitution and in notions of fundamental fairness are respected. The Republican Party platform, on the
other hand, seems to characterize the very idea of federal regulation
of the way colleges and universities respond to campus sexual assault as a “distortion” of Title IX and harmful federal “micromanagement.”302 Moreover, there is some support among Trump advisors for closing OCR down and transferring its functions to the Justice Department—actions that advocates for victims of campus sexual assault fear would undercut efforts to effectively address the
issue.303
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That being said, the views on campus sexual assault adjudication
of Betsy DeVos, President Trump’s newly sworn-in Secretary of
Education, are not well known.304 Senator Bob Casey (D-Penn.)
asked DeVos whether she would commit to keeping the DCL in
place, but she refused to do so, saying it was “premature.”305 She
also balked at promising Senator Patty Murray (D-Wa.) that she
would allow OCR to continue its work investigating and enforcing
rules against campus sexual assault.306 It is this Author’s hope that
DeVos will use her power to address the DCL’s flaws without jettisoning federal efforts to press for an end to the serious problem of
campus sexual assault. Unless and until then, it will be up to the
courts to ensure that accused students receive the fair treatment that
is being denied to them by their colleges and universities.
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